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A PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR GENDERBASED PRACTICES AND STATE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS

Bars, restaurants, and other establishments frequented by the public
often extend preferential treatment to members of one sex in order
to attract a larger or more select clientele. Women, for example, may
be excluded from admissiori. 1 or required to have a male escort; 2 men
may also be excluded 3 or required to pay a greater admission fee than
women. 4 This differential treatment is both inequitable and reinforces
sexual stereotypes 5 humiliating to many individuals. 6
I. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (public bar prohibiting admission of females). See generally Seidenberg, The Federal Bar
v. The Ale House Bar: Women and Public Accommodations, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 318 (1971)
(discussing exclusionary practices).
2. See, e.g., De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (refusal
to serve unescorted woman not prohibited by federal law); De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp.,
59 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1969) (refusal to serve unescorted woman not prohibited
by state law).
3. See, e.g., Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 (N.Y. Div. Human
Rts. Apr. 14, 1980) ("women only" health spa).
4. See McDaniel v. Cory, 631 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1981) (differential prices on the basis of race
and sex); Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 309 N.W.2d 615 (1981)
(differential membership charge for men and women); Abosh v. New York Yankees, Inc., No.
CPS-25284-71 (N.Y. Human Rts. App. Bd. July 19, 1972) (reduced admission prices for women
at Yankee baseball games); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338,
635 P.2d 683 (1981) (reduced admission prices for women at Seattle Supersonics basketball games).
5. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) ("To adhere to practices supported by ancient chivalristic concepts, when there may no
longer exist a need or basis therefor, may only serve to isolate women from the realities of everyday life, and to perpetuate, as a matter of law, economic and sexual exploitation."); B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & L. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION 1037 (1975) ("Exclusion and
segregation are variously defended as necessary to discourage prostitution, to protect women
themselves, or, just as often, to protect the all-male atmosphere."). See generally Freeman, The
Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 203 (1971) (depicting our system as
one of "institutionalized inequality"); Harzenski & Weckesser, The Case for Strictly Scrutinizing Gender-Based Separate But Equal Classification Schemes, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 472-478 (1979)
(separate but equal classification schemes may perpetuate outdated and improper stereotypes
about men and women); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach To The Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977) (socially created sexual distinctions are
often cited to justify sexual differentiation).
6. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding the demeaning nature of a particular wardrobe to be unequally burdensome
and illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)); Interview, Blow Whistle on NBA Champs' Ladies' Nights, 65 A.B.A. J.
1619 (1979) (alleging that ladies' nights derive partly from a view of women as sex objects);
Transcript of Hearings on Exemptions to Sex Discrimination in the Public Accommodations
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Effective relief from such gender-preferential practices has not come
from either the federal Constitution' or federal legislation. 8 Some states
have attempted to compensate for this deficiency by implementing public
accommodations statutes.9 These statutes typically guarantee both sexes
the right of "full and equal enjoyment" of all the "advantages, facilities
and privileges" of a "place of public accommodation." 10 The precise

Law, New York City Comm'n. on Human Rights 200-01 (Jan. 14, 1971), reprinted in B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & L. Ross, supra note 5, at 1069 (testimony that ladies' nights
at ball parks perpetuate an image of women as "unatheletic, improvident, ... and silly"); Harkins,
Sex and the City Council, N. Y. MAG., April 27, 1970, at 10-ll (reciting some instances of
discrimination in public accommodations and the patrons' reaction to them). Cf H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355 (preventing humiliation is one purpose behind the prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations under§ 2000a of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the demeaning nature of a particular wardrobe is unequally burdensome on women and thus illegal under Title Vil of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
7. Whether the fourteenth amendment has any role to play in the resolution of this issue
is currently uncertain. Actions brought pursuant to the fourteenth amendment require a showing
of "state action." See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 545 (1875) ("The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another."). While
this requirement was met in two cases involving preferential treatment for men, see Seidenberg
v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting of liquor license
to all-male bar held to constitute state action); Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., Inc., 402
F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (agreement between owner of restaurant with only limited seating
for women, and city attorney and police department for enforcement of preferential policy, held
sufficient governmental involve·ment to constitute state action), recent Supreme Court decisions
indicate reluctance to find state action in private discrimination. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (granting liquor license to private club is not sufficient state action).
Moreover, where the practice is not explicitly gender-preferential, a showing of disparate impact may not suffice because the fourteenth amendment requires proof of a "specific discriminatory
intent." See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (adverse effects of genderneutral practice must reflect invidious intent to violate the fourteenth amendment); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975) (disparate impact on blacks of a local government's employment
test does not deny equal protection).
8. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit sex discrimination in public
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment . . . of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or
segre~ation on the ground of race, creed, color, religion, or national origin."); De Crow v. Hotel
Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding Title II inapplicable to a case involving sex discrimination).
9. In contrast to the fourteenth amendment, these public accommodation Jaws usually require neither state action nor invidious intent. A showing of state action is unnecessary because
the state may control this aspect of its citizens' behavior through its police power. See, e.g.,
Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IowA L. REV. 1067, 1086-95 (1964).
Moreover, depending upon the precise wording of the statutes, proof of a specific discriminatory
intent may not be necessary to establish a violation of a state's antidiscrimination Jaws. See
infra notes 31-39 & 66-67 and accompanying text.
10. Defining places of public accommodation is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
Avins, What ls A Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. l (1968) (discussing
federal Jaw); Note, Public Accommodations Laws And The Private Club, 54 GEO. L.J. 915 (1966)
(discussing federal and state laws).
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scope of such legislation, however, remains unclear. State courts have
advocated widely differing tests, none of which adequately address the
problems presented by gender-preferential practices.
This Note argues that the proper test of gender-preferential practices in public accommodations proceeds from the principle of "equal
treatment:'' separate standards are tolerable only where reasonable and
applied evenhandedly. Part I sets out a typical public accommodations
statute and criticizes the principle tests used to evaluate this type of
legislation. Part II applies traditional methods of statutory construction which trigger an equal treatment analysis. Extrapolating from this
analysis, Part III advocates a two-part test for examining gender-based
practices in public accommodations.
I.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING GENDER-BASED
PRACTICES IN PUBLIC ACCO MM ODATIO NS

Gender-based practices distinguish individuals by gender, establishing
different standards for men and for women. 11 "Ladies' nights," 12 "men
only" bars, 13 separate accommodations, 14 "women only" health spas, 15
and numerous either practices 16 exemplify overt gender-based distinctions often made ·in public accommodations. In addition, "sex-plus"
practices, 11 such as hair and dress codes, further reflect gender-based
distinctions by regulating on the basis of some "neutral" characteristic. 18
Such gender-based practices have prompted much state legislation.
At least thirty-four jurisdictions have enacted human rights laws pro-

11. In other words, these practices employ sex as a classifying device. See Harzenski &
. Weckesser, supra note 5, at 440 n.2.
12. In this Note the term "ladies' nights" refers to the practice of allowing women to pay
reduced prices either for admission or for the goods and services of a place of public accommodation. For cases testing these practices, see supra note 4.
13. See generally Seidenberg, supra note I.
14. The term "separate accommodations" means gender-segregation, a practice commonly
employed with respect to rest rooms, hospital rooms, and prison facilities.
15. See Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 (N.Y. Div. Human
Rts. April 14, 1980).
16. In addition to such easily categorized practices, a number of less prominent policies have
been adjudicated; See, e.g., Boesen v. Macy's N. Y., Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 N.Y. Div. Human
Rts. June 24, 1980) (different alteration fees for similar men's and women's clothing). Cf. Women
Hemmed In By Alteration Fees, 68 A.B.A.J. 669 (alteration fees); N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1982,
at Al7, col. 1 (Chatham, Massachusetts all-male town band).
17. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1970) (employer's refusal to hire
women with pre-school age children constitutes a sex-based distinction for purposes of Title VII).
See generally Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 46 s. CAL. L. REV. 965, 989-90 (1973).
18. Sex-plus practices focus not upon an immutable characteristic but upon a characteristic
shared by both sexes. In doing so, however, these practices establish different standards for men
and women on the basis of that characteristic.
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hibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations. 19 A typical public
accommodations statute 20 provides:
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race,
creed, color, national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap is recognized as and declared
to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) . . .

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of
public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement. 21
The proper scope of this type of statute, however, is unsettled. Judicial
analysis has been widely divergent, irreconcilable, and generally
misguided.
Public accommodations statutes generally have been interpreted in
one of three widely divergent ways. Some courts seemingly apply a
"gender-blind" 22 test, rejecting any gender-based distinctions in public
accommodations. 23 Other courts look to the motive behind a genderpreferential practice and suggest that an absence of invidious discriminatory intent may excuse an otherwise illegal distinction. 24 Still other~
19. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (1981); CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1982); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 5-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2
(West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1981); KY.
REV. STAT. § 344.145 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art.
498, § 5 (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1980); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 314.010 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 49-2-304 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20.132
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 354-A:8 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-4 (1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-14-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02 (Page Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT.§ 30.670
(1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 20-13-23 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 4-21-III (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 13-7-3 (Supp.
1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE§ 5-11-9 (1979); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (West Supp. 1982).
20. The statutes vary slightly from state to state, especially in the remedies provided. Because
some statutes provide for criminal as well as civil penalties, invidious intent may be a necessary
element of those cases in which criminal penalties are sought. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 469-64(c) (West Supp. 1982). The precise language framing the right may differ, as may the
particular accommodations covered. Nevertheless, the substantive provisions of these statutes,
are in most cases sufficiently similar that the statutes should be interpreted identically. For an
overview of these statutes see Note, Survey of Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978).
21. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
22. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,238 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is designed to be "color-blind.").
23. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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utilize an "encouragement discouragement" distinction, upholding practices designed merely to encourage attendance. 25 Although each of these
analyses is plausible, none support the true purpose of public accommodations laws: equal treatment.

A.

Sweeping Interpretations and Gender-blindness

Some court opinions imply that state antidiscrirnination laws were intended to prohibit all gender-based distinctions in public accomodations. In Braun v. Swiston 26 a New York trial court held that excluding
a long-haired male from defendant's restaurant violated the state antidiscrimination statute because defendant had no similar policy excluding long-haired females. 2 ' In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries
of America, Inc. 28 the Washington State Appellate Court struck down
price reductions offered only to women ("ladies' nights"), reasoning
that this practice would clearly be illegal had it been offered on the
basis of race. 29
Whether or not these outcomes are correct, the courts' opinions articulate an unnecessarily broad test. Taken to its logical conclusion,
this "gender-blindness" test leads to absurd, unisex requirements. Certain situations warrant separate treatment for men and women; when
applied evenhandedly such separate treatment need not burden one sex

25. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
26. 72 Misc. 2d 661, 340 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1972).
27. Id. at 662, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
28. 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027 (1979), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
29. Id. at 171-74, 600 P.2d at 1032-34. The court noted that:
The injustice of the case at bar would readily be recognized as impermissible if it arose
in the context of race. It would be inconceivable to have a "Blacks' Night" or a "Whites'
Night" or a "Filipinos' Night" at the Seattle Center Coliseum. It would be unsupportable
for the City of Seattle to increase its coffers or take in any revenues on the basis of
race classifications.
Id. at 171, 600 P.2d at 1032.
The court's analogy to race is nevertheless imperfect. The Supreme Court has historically treated
racial discrimination and sex discrimination differently under the fourteenth amendment. As a
result, gender-based discrimination triggers close scrutiny though not the "strict scrutiny" applied to racial classifications. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial
distinctions must serve some "overriding statutory purpose"), and Korematsu v·. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("(A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect ... [and) courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."),
with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("Classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."), and
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (application of the Craig test to "benign" gender-discriminatory
practices).
Moreover, gender-based distinctions, unlike racial distinctions, legitimately may exist because
of biological differences between males and females. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976)
(bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title Vil). Cf. Rosther v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981) (upholding registration of men but not women for the draft).
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more than the other. 30 Separate hospital rooms and rest rooms are two
such examples. The overly broad test implicit in Braun and MacLean,
therefore, does not accommodate gender-based distinctions which may
be non-discriminatory and socially desirable. Existing restrictive interpretations, however, are equally unacceptable.

B.

Restrictive Interpretations

In contrast to the gender-blindness approach, which does not look
behind a gender-based practice, some courts focus on the "means and
motivations" behind gender-based practices.
1. Invidious intent- In reversing the appellate court's decision in
MacLean, 31 the Washington State Supreme Court noted in dictum that
an absence of discriminatory intent might excuse a gender-preferential
practice. 32 The court then noted that in the case of "ladies' nights,"
an inference of discriminatory intent could be rebutted by a showing
that defendant had also maintained policies benefiting men, such as
price reductions for military personnel. 33
Proof of "invidious intent," however, has never been required under
state public accommodations laws 34 or analogous federal law. 35 Such
30. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
31. 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
32. Id. at 341, 635 P .2d at 684.
33. Id.
34. Other courts, including the Braun court and the lower court in MacLean have ignored
the issue of defendant's intent. One court has explicitly rejected this argument in the context
of discrimination on the basis of handicap. See Vidrich v. Vic Tanny Int'!, Inc., 102 Mich. App.
230, 301 N.W.2d 482 (1980) (exclusion of a blind patron on the basis of safety concerns and
lack of discriminatory intent prohibited). CJ. New York Inst. of Technology v. State Div. of
Human Rts., 48 A.D.2d 132, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 201, 207 (1975) (construing the employment discrimination provisions of the New York Human Rights Law to prohibit a hiring system which was
not discriminatory in form or intent but had such an effect), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d
316, 386 N. Y.S.2d 685 (1976).
35. The federal counterpart to state public accommodations laws is Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), which bars discrimination in places of public,accommodation on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin. Lack of invidious intent does
not excuse discrimination otherwise barred by this statute. For instance, in Katzenbach v. Gulf
State Theaters, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. Miss. 1966), the defendants attempted to justify
the exclusion of blacks from a movie theater by arguing that blacks were admitted in other theaters
owned by the defendants, and that economic reasons alone motivated the challenged conduct.
They claimed that their discriminatory actions did not manifest a discriminatory intent and therefore
fell outside the statutory proscriptions. Rejecting this argument, the district court noted that
Title II forbids all racial discrimination "regardless of the presence or absence of racial prejudice
in the minds of the defendants." Id. at 552.
In addition, no other federal anti-discrimination legislation requires a showing of invidious
discriminatory intent. Proof that an employment practice unrelated to job performance has a
disparate impact on members of a protected group will support a discrimination claim under
Title VII of the 1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. Dist.
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a requirement would undermine these statutes. Moreover, endorsing
"offsetting" discriminatory practices merely exacerbates an already
discriminatory policy. Gender-based distinctions, even if "the product
of innocent, protective, or well-intentioned motivations," 36 may reinforce stereotypes 37 that later encourage even more serious sex
discrimination. 38 Balancing - or more accurately, offsetting
discriminatory practices - must therefore be rejected as incompatible
with a societal goal of equal rights for all persons regardless of gender. 39
2. Encouragement/discouragement- Some courts hold that practices which "encourage" admission of a single sex do not contravene
public accommodations statutes. In Tucich v. Dearborn Racquet C/ub 40
the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state's public accommodations law does not bar preferential admission prices for one sex. The
court ruled that this practice merely encourages attendance and does
not deny the non-favored class "the advantages, facilities, and
privileges" of the public accommodation. 41
#II, 641 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1981). The courts are currently split on whether a Title VI
claim requires only proof of a discriminatory impact. See generally Note, Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1095
(1982).
36. Harzenski &. Weckesser, supra note 5, at 468.
37. See generally id. at 472 (claiming that strict scrutiny should apply to gender-based separatebut-equal statutory schemes because, though discriminatory motives may be non-existent or hard
to prove, history demonstrates the misuse of such classification schemes).
38. See id. at 472-78 (noting a continued reliance upon "habit-forming stereotypical assumptions"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1063-66 (noting that stereotypes
"chill sex-role experimentation"). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975) (referring
to self-fulfilling nature of sterotypes); Freeman, supra note 5 (describing how the legal system
engenders and perpetuates sex-based myths). Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 594 (noting our
"patriarchal system of power relationships").
39. Even within the parameters of its own balancing test, the Washington State Supreme
Court's characterization in MacLean of offsetting practices is highly questionable. Men and women
alike benefit from a senior citizens' night or military members' night, whereas only women
were eligible for the reduced admission price offered on "Ladies' Night."
40. 107 Mich. App. 398, 309 N.W.2d 615 (1981) (involving male plaintiffs suit against several
area tennis clubs which offered preferential admission prices to women).
41. Id. at 405-406, 309 N.W.2d at 618. See also Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs.,
Inc., 84 Mich. App. 522, 526-27, 269 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (1978) (preferential membership fees
for women); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 635 P.2d
683, 685-86 (preferential admission policies do not make a member of the non-preferred class
feel "not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited."). But see McDaniel v. Cory, 631 P.2d 82
(Alaska 1981) (rejecting differential pricing schemes for men and women); Abosh v. New York
Yankees, Inc., No. CPS-25284-71 (N.Y. Human Rts. App. Bd., July 19, 1972) (holding that
reduced admission prices for women at Yankee baseball games violated state public accommodations law); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4592 (1979) (discrimination "against any person in
the price, terms or conditions upon which access to such accommodation, advantages, facilities,
and privileges may depend" is prohibited); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04(l)(a) (West Supp. 1982)
(violation of state law to deny or charge another a "higher price than the regular rate").
For a definitional treatment of the statutes see infra notes 48°50 and accompanying text. The
distinction between practices that encourage and those that discourage admission is critical to
the Tucich Court's argument because practices discouraging admission clearly violate the statute
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Like the invidious intent test, however, practices encouraging the
attendance of one sex may perpetuate unreasonable stereotypes. 42 For
instance, when the defendant in Tucich argued that the differential
membership fee helped persuade women to attend during the day, 43
this "justification" reflected a stereotype of women as "homemakers"
who have considerable free time during the day. Furthermore, implicit
in Tucich and similar opinions is the assumption that practices encouraging the attendance of one sex do not violate the statutory language
because they benefit all patrons 44 or at least do not exclude members
of the non-preferred group. 45 The validity of such an assumption is
questionable. Preferential pricing policies may well impose a "surcharge"46 on the non-favored group. This surcharge may outweigh the
economic benefits potential patrons derive from the preferential practice, thereby deterring their attendance. 47 Thus, the court's argument

by denying potential patrons all the advantages and facilities of an establishment. Such a fine
distinction, however, is overly strict and unwarranted, see infra notes 51-65 and accompanying
text, in light of the liberal construction these statutes should be given. See, e.g., N. Y. EXEC.
LAW§ 300 (McKinney 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-1 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.020 (Supp. 1982). Moreover, preferential admission prices can serve an exclusionary function
which denies members of the non-preferred class the facilities of an accommodation. See infra
notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the encouragement/discouragement distinction in some
Title VII cases on the grounds that policies encouraging employment of a protected class may
atone for the vestiges of past intentional discrimination hindering present opportunities to qualify
for employment. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1978). This logic,
however, is inapposite to public accommodation cases: absent a discriminatory policy, nothing
impedes the ability of one group to attend an accommodation.
42. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
43. 107 Mich. App. at 401, 309 N.W.2d at 617.
44. See id. at 405, 309 N.W.2d at 619 ("[T)he price differential is designed to encourage
membership and make the club facilities more available to both sexes."); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 342, 635 P.2d 683, 685 (noting that "ladies' nights"
benefit the team's fans by providing additional revenues with which the best players can be bought).
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. A surcharge is a price above that normally demanded for a good or service. Few charges
are explicitly denoted as surcharges, and a determination of whether a fee constitutes the "normal"
price or a surcharge is quite difficult, especially where different rates are charged at different
times. In addition, any discriminatory price could be viewed as a surcharge relative to the lower
price charged an advantaged group.
47. In some cases, this exclusion may even be intended. Although an intentionally exclusionary price would violate even the narrow MacLean test, it may be difficult for the courts
to determine that a particular price is a surcharge, see supra note 46, or that it is intended to
be prohibitive.
Moreover, to the extent that a preferential pricing policy leads to increased attendance by
the preferred group, the policy may effectively exclude other patrons because of an accommodation's limited capacity.
Finally, these practices may also result in distributive inefficiencies. Consider a ladies' night
policy making $2.00 drinks available for $1.00 to female patrons. Patron F, a female, may value
drink X at $1.25 and patron M, a male, may value that same drink at $1.75. At $2, patrons
F and M will be unwilling to purchase drink X while at the preferential $1 price for women
patron F may be induced to buy it. If drink X is consumed by patron F who values it substantially
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fails: practices encouraging the attendance of one sex do no necessarily
benefit all patrons and may even exclude them.
In sum, the sweeping "gender-blindness" test and the restrictive
invidious-intent and encouragement/discouragement tests fail to withstand close analysis; the former because some situations warrant differential treatment, the latter because they may foster unreasonable
stereotypes or promote exclusionary practices. On a more fundamental level, however, these tests are entirely misguided: none comports
fully with the legislative intent underlying state public accommodations
laws.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE

The uncertain scope of public accommodations laws can be attributed
to the attempt to achieve broad goals through vague language. Crucial
terms such as "full enjoyment," "advantages," or "privileges" may
be undefined 48 or the statutory definitions unclear. For example, the
state of Washington's anti-discrimination law defines "full enjoyment"
to "include" the.right to be free from acts that "directly or inairectly"
cause a potential patron to feel "not welcome, accepted, desired or
solicited. " 49 Use of the term "includes" suggests that the statute is
not exhaustive, lending itself to diverse interpretations. 5° Moreover,
clarity is hardly furthered by terms as nebulous as "not welcome";
any preferential practice can make a member of the non-preferred class
feel "not welcome" or unsolicited. The precise applicability of this

less than patron M, then society does not derive its maximum utility from its available resources,
in this case drink X.
48. The terms "privileges" and "advantages" are not defined in any state's statute. "Full
enjoyment" is directly or indirectly defined in only some of the statutes. See infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
49. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982). The Michigan statute, MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28-343, 344 (Callaghan 1981), indirectly defines it as a withholding, refusal, or denial
of all the "advantages, facilities, and privileges" of an accommodation. See Tucich v. Dearborn
Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 402, 309 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1981).
50. The MacLean court refused to address the issue of what conduct, other than that expressly stated in the statute, the term "includes" might encompass. MacLean v. First Northwest
Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 635 P.2d 683, 686. The dissent, in contrast, suggested that the statutory definition of full enjoyment was intended only to illustrate possible
applications of the term "full enjoyment." Id. at 350, 635 P.2d at 689. (Utter, J., dissenting).
Rather than confront this issue, the MacLean majority held that the plaintiff had not been "injured" for purposes of the Washington statute, a puzzling ruling that hinged on the community
property laws of Washington. The court reasoned that the plaintiff benefited from "ladies' night"
because of the reduction his wife received and thus sustained no injury within the meaning of
the statute. This logic is apparently inapplicable in those states without community property
laws though the court stated that its reasoning would apply had the plaintiff taken only a female
friend. Id. at 685, 635 P.2d at 690. Moreover, this holding is simply not persuasive. See id.
at 351, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting) (discrimination can be per se injurious).
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statute is therefore uncertain, and must be determined through traditional interpretive techniques.
Courts confronted with an ambiguous statute must construe its terms
in accordance with the legislature's intent. 51 A preferred source of
legislative intent is the statute's legislative history. 52 Where this source
is not conclusive - often the case with state public accommodations
laws 53 - courts must turn to traditional rules of statutory construction. 54
Applied to state public accommodations legislation, these traditional
rules suggest the same thing: the legislation was intended to provide
"equal treatment" for both men and women.
For instance, the plain or "ordinary meaning" rule, 55 when applied
to a typical antidiscrimination statute, 56 supports the equal treatment
interpretation. "Advantage" is commonly defined as a "favorable position" or "benefit"; 51 "privilege" is defined as "a right granted as a
benefit" or an "exemption from a burden. " 58 Substituting these definitions for the statutory language, the law guarantees both sexes the full
enjoyment (or full and equal enjoyment) of all the benefits an accom51. See, e.g., United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.) ("Flinch
as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position
of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the
concrete occasion."), afj'd, 345 U.S. 979 (1953).
52. See, e.g., Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 489, 491.
53. Legislative histories to state statutes are notoriously scarce. See C. NUTTING & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 560 (1978). A thorough search of the history underlying the Michigan public accommodations statute disclosed only procedural data. See 3 MICH.
SENATE J., 2479 (1972) (P.L. 4139 and history thereoO. In addition, written requests for available
historical information by the author of this Note to many state Human Rights Commissions
proved equally unsuccessful. With one exception, the commissions contacted responded negatively
or failed to respond. Materials submitted by the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights
shed no light on the proper scope of the District of Columbia statute. This correspondence is
on file with the Journal of Law Reform.
54. See generally, P. MAXWELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 39 (P. Langham 12th
ed. 1969).
55. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893):
There being no evidence that the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables' have acquired any
special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Of
that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words
in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence,
but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.
See generally E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 319 (1940).
56. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982) (set out supra text accompanying note 19).
57. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 30 (1971).
58. Id. at 1805. In Tucich v. Dearborn Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 405, 309 N.W.2d
615, 619 (1981), the Michigan Court of Appeals ignored the issue of whether plaintiff had been
denied a privilege or advantage, focusing instead on whether he had been denied the use of
the "facilities." Such an oversight is indefensible. The statute provides for the full enjoyment
of all the privileges and advantages of a public accommodation, not merely access to the facilities
of an accommodation. Besides, the price differential may act in an exclusionary manner, effectively denying the plaintiff access to the accommodation. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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modation extends to its patrons. Given the ordinary meaning of their
terms, public accommodations statutes prohibit any gender preferential practice resulting in greater burdens or benefits; in short, they mandate "equal treatment."
The "mischief" rule 59 further supports this interpretation. Under the
"mischief rule," statutes should be interpreted in that manner most
conducive to suppressing the wrong the common law failed to address.
The preambles to many public accommodations statutes 60 indicate that
the statutes were intended to prevent humiliation61 and to make all
the goods, services, and facilities of an accommodation equally available
to men and women. 62 The statutes thus promote equal treatment rather
than gender-preferences. 63
Confronted with race preferences, courts and commentators have
consistently applied the principle of equal treatment when interpreting
these statutes. 64 Gender-based practices have not, however, prompted
an analogous response. 65 The "invidious intent test, " 66 for example,
focuses upon the defendant's discriminatory motivation, not the consequences of the preferential act. The encouragement/ discouragement
test similarly ignores differential effects. 67 To the extent that these restrictive tests permit courts to ignore disparate treatment, they are inconsistent with the fundamental principle of equal treatment underlying
public accommodations statutes.
In contrast to these restrictive tests, the "gender-blindness" test prohibiting all gender-based distinctions 68 is overinclusive. The principle
59. This rule apparently originated in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a (1584), cited in P. MAXWELL, supra note 54, at 4043.
60. Preambles may be used as an interpretive aid. See generally P. MAXWELL, supra note
54, at 6-9.
61. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 344.020 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (Supp. 1982).
62. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (West 1981) ("equal access to and use of" a public
accommodation). Indeed, many statutes use the term "full and equal enjoyment" rather than
"full enjoyment." See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (Supp. 1981).
63. The language of several statutes specifically forbids preferential treatment. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 942.04 (West Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-23 (1979) (prohibiting
unequal treatment in terms or conditions of accommodation).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1978) (places
of public accommodation have an obligation to treat each member of the public equally in the
absence of good cause); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 28, 194 P. 813 (1921)
(public accommodations laws confer "upon all persons . . . the right to be admitted to the
• places enumerated on equal terms ... "); Caldwell, State Public Accommodations Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REV. 841, 842 (1965) ("The legal
objective of public accommodations statutes is to make equal access to and the use of places
of public accommodations . . . a public right.").
65. But see MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d
1027 (1979) (involving gender-preferential practice) (citing Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co.,
114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813 (1921)), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
66. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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of equal treatment implicit in public accommodations statutes prohibits
only preferential practices: practices conferring greater "advantages"
or "privileges" on members of one sex. 69 Not every gender-based distinction violates this standard. Separate-but-equal standards' 0 originating
in cultural or biological differences, if they do not perpetuate
unreasonable stereotypes' 1 and both males and females are held to
"relatively similar standards," 72 need not burden one sex more than
the other. 73
The California Court of Appeals recognized this principle in Hales
v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club, 74 a case involving different dress
requirements for men and women. The Hales court remanded the
dispute to determine whether the particular dress code was preferential. 75
The remand order implied that a different dress requirement for males
and females need not burden one sex more than the other. Hales thus
recognizes that unisex standards need not be established to satisfy the
"equal treatment" principle.
Ill.

A PROPOSED MODEL FOR CONSTRUING PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS STATUTES

The key issue in assessing the legitimacy of a gender-based practice
69. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
70. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that racially
based separate-but-equal educational systems violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (striking down state miscegenation
statute).
Separate-but-equal gender-based situations do not enjoy the same degree of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (maintenance of
some single sex schools in a system otherwise coeducational held constitutional), aff'd per curiam
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). See generally Comment, Plessy Revived: The
Separate But Equal Doctrine and Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585
(1977).
71. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
72. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th
Cir. I 979) (striking down a dress code under Title VII because women were held to a stricter
standard than men).
73. See, e.g., Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 456 ("We admit that neither group
in a separate but equal situation appears to be especially benefited or burdened; nor does either
group appear to be especially disadvantaged.").
Title VII grooming cases provide an instructive analogy. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) ("It does not appear that defendant fails
to impose grooming standards for female employees, thus in this respect each sex is treated
equally."); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d lll5, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[flaking account of basic differences in male and female physiques and common differences in customary
dress of male and female employees, it is not usually thought that [a dress code] is unlawful
discrimination because of sex.").
74. 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1977) (women dressed in leisure suits admitted
to an accommodation while a similarly attired male was not).
75. Id. at 28, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
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is whether the separate standards burden or benefit the sexes unequally. 76
Any gender-based distinction should raise a presumption of inequality, 77
but not every such distinction violates the concept of equal treatment. 78
This Note advocates a two-part test to determine the validity of separate
standards embodied in gender-based distinctions. Separate standards
apply equally and should be upheld when (1) they can be justified by
commonly accepted social norms and do not promote unreasonable
stereotypes, and (2) they apply evenhandedly to both men and women.

A.

Commonly Accepted Social Norms and Unreasonable Stereotypes

Separate gender-based standards can be equal when they are supported by "commonly accepted" cultural differences. 79 Nevertheless,
the prevalence of a particular gender-based practice is not dispositive
of the equal treatment issue. Even widely accepted cultural distinctions
can perpetuate the burdensome, humiliating, or demeaning stereotypes 80
public accommodations statutes were designed to eliminate. 81 The "commonly accepted social norm" defense might be invoked to justify every
gender-based practice, 82 protecting even invidious discrimination merely

76. When determining whether a practice burdens or benefits the sexes unequally, the focus
should always be upon the separateness of standards rather than the practice itself. A practice
may incorporate standards for both sexes; these separate standards, however, may be unequal
or preferential. See, e.g., supra note 72 and accompanying text (dress codes). See also infra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing evenhandness).
77. Because few gender-based practices are likely to satisfy this Note's proposed equal-treatment
test, every gender-based distinction should raise a rebuttable presumption of unequal burdens.
The burden would then be upon the party implementing the practice to show that the practice
is nonpreferential.
78. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) (as long as they can be justified in "commonly accepted social norms," separate standards of dress for men and women do not necessarily
violate Title VII); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 592-94 (noting that gender-segregation is often
tolerated where it is "mutually undesirable" for men and women to associate, such as in rest rooms).
A determination of whether a practice is "widely accepted," however, would likely require
evidence both of similar practices elsewhere and of the degree of patron approval, evidence both
difficult to acquire and to evaluate.
80. Certain culturally imposed role expectations become so ingrained in a social system that
members may sometimes fail to recognize the false stereotypes underlying these expectations.
Consequently, a stereotyped member of society may accept mechanically this stereotype and assume
the corresponding personality traits. This can result in both perpetuation of the stereotype and
psychological defects in the actor. See generally Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 472-78;
Note, "A Little Dearer than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 260, 271-83 (1971).
81. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
82. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961), illustrates the point:
[W)oman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that
it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare,
to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless
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because it is rooted in tradition. Consequently, even widely accepted
gender-based practices in public accommodations should be closely
scrutinized to determine whether they tend to promote unreasonable
stereotypes.
The reasonableness of a particular gender-based distinction depends
upon two factors. The first is the cultural foundation for the distinction. Distinctions deriving in whole or in part from a humiliating or
demeaning stereotype are inherently suspect. 83 For instance, the practice of excluding unescorted women from bars has sometimes stemmed
from the belief that these women may be of low moral character. 84
Some distinctions, however, serve merely to differentiate males from
females without perpetuating unreasonable stereotypes·. Dress codes,
for example, reflect social distinctions between the sexes rather than
underlying, unfounded, and humiliating stereotypes. 85
The second element of this reasonableness test requires that the distinction serve some important social policy. 86 If a gender-based practice
implicates a demeaning stereotype, courts should balance the offenshe herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilties.
See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life.").
83. Some scholars argue that all gender-based distinctions, except those that are biologically
necessary, are unreasonable because men would be virtually indistinguishable from women in
the absence of culturally imposed differences. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 603-15;
Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 473, 477; Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy
Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 15 C0LUM. L. REV. 441, 461 (1975).
Professor Wasserstrom labels this the "assimilationist" view. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 604.
Even if no legitimate non-cultural reasons justify some gender-based distinctions, however, these
distinctions are not necessarily founded upon demeaning stereotypes. Some practices, like dress
codes, serve merely to distinguish men from women without promoting the humiliating stereotypes
that accompany practices like "men-only" bars. But see id. at 594 (all gender-based distinctions,
including separate rest rooms, promote our oppressive "patriarchal system of power relationship").
84. See, e.g., De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1969).
85. See, e.g., M. ROACH, The Social Symbolism of Women's Dress, in THE FABRICS OF
CULTURE 415, 416 (1979) ("Once distinctions between the dress of sexes have existed for a long
time, as is true in Western society, their continuation is supported by custom even though the
tasks that men and women perform may change."). But see id. at 416 ("[T]hrough time a complex set of meanings becomes attached to the traditional dress of each sex, and sanctions develop
that discourage behavior inconsistent with meanings.").
86. A number of state public accommodations statutes contain a public policy exception.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (Michie/Law
Coop. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981). Such a provision would likely exempt
many of the practices permitted under this Note's proposed test. A statutory public policy exception is narrower, however, than a reasonableness standard. Dress codes, for example, while
reasonable, would not trigger a statutory public policy exception because such codes serve no
important social function. Conversely, a statutory public policy exception is broader than the
proposed reasonableness test; it could be invoked to exempt establishments incapable of complying with the state antidiscrimination law. See Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., N.Y.
State Div. of Human Rights, April 14, 1980 ("women only" health spa with inadequate facilities
to serve both sexes granted an exemption from the state law) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform).
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siveness of this stereotype against the social policies the practice promotes, allowing only important social policies 87 to outweigh the burdensome effects of a stereotype. Notwithstanding those who feel that
gender-based cultural differences are never rationally based, 88 some social
policies clearly legitimize certain gender-based distinctions. Privacy interests, for example, justify separate rest rooms and hospital rooms
for men and women; 89 such important interests outweigh any of the
stereotypes conceivably underlying the practice.
The justification that "ladies' nights" are widely accepted and encourage attendance thus fails to support this practice under the proposed reasonableness test. The widespread acceptance of "ladies' nights"
does not excuse perpetuating the demeaning stereotype of women as
improvident and helpless. 90 Moreover, encouraging the attendance of
only one sex serves no important social policy. Conversely, a court
might well be persuaded that concerns about exposure, violence, and
privacy warrant separation of the sexes in rest rooms, hospital rooms,
and correctional facilities. 91
For a limited category of practices, however, the issue of
reasonableness is difficult to resolve. Although privacy interests may
justify separate rest rooms and prohibit "men only bars, " 92 in other
contexts the privacy justification is not clearly determinative. For example, public accommodations sometimes reserve separate time slots
for male and female patrons, with some hours open to both sexes. 93
Although only minimally burdensome, 94 perhaps this separate-but-equal
practice fails the reasonableness test because separation may promote
the offensive prejudice that one sex is bothersome to the other. At
the same time, no important social policies outweigh the potentially
87. The definition of "important" social policies is not addressed in this Note. Such a determination will depend on a multitude of factors not readily examinable in the present analysis.
88. See supra note 83.
89. But see Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 594 (arguing that the purpose behind segregated
rest rooms and hospital rooms is not privacy but the preservations of the mystery concerning
the genitalia which maintains the "primacy of heterosexual attraction central to [the] ... patriarchal
system of power relationships we have today.").
90. See supra note 6.
91. But see supra note 89.
92. The privacy concerns of the patron of an all-male bar differ markedly from those of
the hospital patient. While the hospital patient is compelled to remain in the hospital, the bar
patron may seek respite in alternative settings. Moreover, worries about bodily exposure are
not relevant to the bar patron's privacy concerns. Consequently, because all-male bars serve
no important public policy, and may promote the demeaning stereotype of women as
"homemakers" incapable of handling both themselves and their liquor in a bar, the proposed
reasonableness standard is not met.
93. This practice is fairly common in establishments such as skating rinks.
94. Unlike operating an all-male bar, reserving different hours for men and women does
not exclude a particular sex from attending the accommodation. But such a practice may be
de facto exclusionary. If, for example, the accommodation sponsored separate hours for women
during inconvenient times of the day, it would effectively deter their attendance.
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offensive impressions it fosters. 95 Another setting where the
reasonableness test is not clearly determinative is that of ''women only''
health spas. Like segregated time slots, such segregated spas may depict
one sex as a nuisance to the other. On the other hand, this segregation
is founded upon the same privacy reasons underlying separate rest
rooms. 96 Notwithstanding this potential justification, "women only"
health spas fail the second part of this Note's preferentiality test, the
evenhandedness requirement.

B.

Evenhandedness

A reasonable gender-based practice may nevertheless be preferential. "Evenhandedness" requires that places of public accommodation
provide equal benefits to members of both sexes. 97 Even where segregation is reasonable, accommodations must ·furnish equivalent facilities
and privileges. Thus, if a gender-based practice dictates "two entirely
different standards," 98 rather than relatively similar standards, it fails
the evenhandedness requirement and violates the equal treatment
principle.
In most cases, this issue of equality of standards is easily resolved.
A hospital, for example, may not reserve all the best rooms for members
of one sex. Similarly, assuming that the occasional segregation of
customers at particular hours is not unreasonable, 99 one sex cannot
be granted this privilege and the other denied it. Such unequal treatment fails the evenhandedness requirement. By the same token,
establishments catering solely to members of one sex, such as ''men
only" bars or "women only" health spas, fail to survive scrutiny. Even
if justified on privacy grounds, 100 this exclusiveness is impermissible
because members of only one sex are restricted. The failure to provide
similar facilities for both sexes is a breach of the accommodation's
obligation of equal treatment. 101
95. The privacy interest secured by this practice more closely approximates that of the allmale bar than the hospital room. See supra note 92.
96. As used in this Note, the term "segregated spas" refers to exercise spas accommodating
only one sex. Spas which accommodate both sexes yet have certain segregated facilities (e.g.
saunas) may more closely resemble segregated rest rooms.
97. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. Cf. Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc.,
373 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a place of public accommodation is obligated to
treat each member of the public equally in the absence of good cause).
98. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII prohibits "two entirely separate dress codes" for men and women).
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. A health spa established prior to the passage of a state's public accommodation statute
might be exempt from the law if it were incapable of providing facilities for both men and women.
See supra note 86. An alternative to exemption, however, is alternating days for men and women.

FALL 1982]

Public Accommodations Laws

151

In certain cases, determinations of evenhandedness are not so simple. The evenhandedness of standards promulgated under practices such
as dress codes, for example, depends greatly on geographic and social
customs. 102 Where evenhandedness depends upon such factors, a jury
is especially suited to resolve the issue. 103 Once a trial court determines
that a gender-based practice is not unreasonable, the jury should then
be allowed to decide whether the separate standards apply evenhandedly.
CONCLUSION

State public accommodations statutes embody a legislative goal of
equal treatment for all persons. Courts interpreting these statutes have
failed, however, to recognize the principle of equal treatment underlying such legislation; the result has often been either overly restrictive
or overbroad application of these statutes. This Note proposes a
preferentiality test for gender-based distinctions which will advance the
fundamental "equal treatment" objective of public accommodations
legislation without creating a gender-blind society. Application of this
test will ensure equal treatment for both men and women while preserving those gender-based distinctions which are neither demeaning nor

102.

See Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club, 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr.

555, 558 (1979) (remanding with order that the trial court determine "arbitrariness" of dress

codes on the basis of "community standards").
"Hair codes" also reflect social convention and prevailing notions of "fashion." They are
sometimes used to exclude long-haired males. See, e.g., Braun v. Swiston, 72 Misc. 2d 661,
340 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1972) (exclusion of long-haired males held to violate state antidiscrimination law).
Hair codes are more difficult than dress codes to analyze. A distinction between long-haired
males and long-haired females can conceivably apply in an evenhanded manner because "fashion"
dictates that men be held to stricter grooming requirements than women. This argument, however,
overlooks the issue of whether this distinction is "reasonable." Unlike dress codes, a humiliating
stereotype underlies a hair code which distinguishes long-haired males from long-haired females.
Long-haired males are frequently considered rebellious or otherwise objectionable. See, e.g., Ham
v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 530 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting). Nor does
the exclusion of long-haired males serve an important social policy. Although the length of an
employee's hair may be regulated under Title VII on the grounds that a salaried representative
is expected to present a certain image, see, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d
ll 15, ll24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973), no such considerations apply with respect to public accommodations statutes. Indeed, this policy may so burden the patron that it contravenes certain constitutional policies. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970).
103. Judge Pell's dissent in Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033
(7th Cir. 1979), underscores this point. The judge disagreed with the majority as to whether
men and women were subject to relatively equal standards, stating, "[i)n sum, customary attire
for the men employees of Talman seems to me to confine these employees in a uniform to the
same extent as the Talman dress code does for women . . . . " Id. at 1034.
Fashion is an area in which the jury is likely to have as much expertise as the court. Moreover,
community standards will have some bearing on the question of fashions and a jury is best able
to ascertain these community standards. The evenhandedness of fashion-oriented standards,
therefore, is a question particularly suited for the jury.
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burdensome, thereby permitting each gender to retain its distinctive
character.

-Alan J. Hoff

